Mechanism

Campaign-Style Governance: Why The CCP Solves Problems Through Special Actions

How special campaigns turn governance problems into political mobilization and push the cost downward.

On the evening of November 18, 2017, a fire in an apartment building in Xinjian No. 2 village, Xihongmen township, killed 19 people and injured eight. Two days later, the Beijing Work Safety Committee launched a 40-day campaign of "major inspections, major clearances, and major rectifications." Its order covered every district, industry, and type of business in the city. Rental compounds, industrial yards, warehouses, wholesale markets, and unauthorized buildings on the urban fringe received special attention. Districts had to report the number of inspections, demolitions, closures, penalties, and people handled. ^[1]

Street offices and enforcement teams quickly turned the safety campaign into a population clearance. Migrant workers received three days' notice or less to leave, sometimes only hours. Authorities cut utilities and demolished housing. A review by the Congressional-Executive Commission on China found that media and advocacy groups estimated tens of thousands were affected, mainly workers without Beijing household registration. Artist Hua Yong filmed the evictions, fled police, and was detained in Tianjin on suspicion of gathering a crowd to disrupt traffic. ^{[2] [3]}

The fire exposed long-running failures in rental housing, fire inspection, and the hukou system. Beijing did not first arrange replacement housing or hold a public inquiry into years of regulatory neglect. The municipal Party leadership named a campaign, and local offices produced visible results by removing buildings and tenants. A disaster that called for safer housing became collective punishment for other poor renters.

The 40-day campaign targeted migrant tenants

Beijing's order did not explicitly call for migrant expulsion, but it singled out rental yards, peri-urban neighborhoods, and sites awaiting demolition. Local officials faced a 40-day deadline, a demand for complete coverage, and reporting tables. Inspecting each building, arranging repairs, and rehousing tenants would take time and divide responsibility. Cutting utilities, sealing doors, and demolishing structures quickly increased the totals for hazards corrected and buildings cleared.

That response fits the bureaucratic logic of a political campaign. Superiors elevate a goal and demand that no risk be missed. Subordinates widen the target population to protect themselves from an omission. A valid lease, a place to sleep in winter, and a child's access to school do not count toward the main performance figures. The campaign counts inspections and demolition. Human loss stays outside the spreadsheet.

Public outrage later led Beijing officials to emphasize orderly enforcement and humane treatment. The new wording did not restore demolished homes or answer why migrant workers had been confined to dangerous housing for years. The CCP first created harm through political pressure, then described that harm as rough implementation below the municipal leadership.

Special actions displace regular legal procedure

Routine government would require clear fire standards, periodic inspections, appeal periods, and rehousing duties. Courts would be able to stop unlawful utility cuts. Campaign governance suits the CCP because Party committees can jump over those slower constraints and force agencies into a single objective through meetings, special teams, ledgers, and daily reporting. The Party constitution asserts leadership across public life, and institutional reforms continue to place Party direction inside administration. A campaign turns that control into short-term enforcement capacity. ^{[4] [5]}

Law does not disappear completely. Local agencies still cite fire, planning, and tenancy rules. The campaign decides in advance that risks must be cleared, and procedure is then used to deliver that result. Tenants given hours or days cannot locate a court, prepare documents, and suspend demolition. Speed itself removes the chance of a remedy.

Political mobilization also suppresses ordinary disagreement among agencies. Housing officials may understand that mass eviction will create a shelter crisis. Fire inspectors may seek repairs to particular equipment, while street offices know who lives in each building. A special action compresses those different judgments into compliance with the Party secretary's line. An official needs to show energetic action, not prove that each household presents an immediate danger.

Cadres use totals to demonstrate compliance

A campaign demands visible output. Units inspected, square meters demolished, businesses closed, and people punished can be added quickly and ranked. Cadres use those totals to demonstrate force to superiors, while propaganda outlets present them as proof of concentrated state capacity. Whether residents find safe housing or fire risk moves to another suburb will emerge months later, after the campaign has closed.

Targets also produce escalation at each level. The city orders inspection. A district adds a clearance rate. A street office expands closures to avoid falling behind. Each level passes risk downward until renters, shopkeepers, and workers absorb it. Beijing did not have to name every person for eviction. The system generated mass removal because every official knew that doing too little was more dangerous than doing too much.

Hua Yong's detention shows that the campaign also controlled documentation. His videos recorded the cold, haste, and destroyed property omitted from official tables. They damaged the government's account of a safety rectification, so police treated the recorder as another problem to remove.

The underlying failures survived the campaign

Forty days can demolish buildings. They cannot repair Beijing's hukou discrimination or shortage of affordable housing. Migrant workers keep the city running while lacking the housing, education, and social protections available to registered residents. Dangerous rentals grew from years of exclusion and regulatory failure. Eviction moved their occupants farther away.

The CCP favors special actions because they rewrite institutional failure as enforcement strength. After leaders announce a campaign, local offices use cumulative totals to prove compliance and propaganda departments publish the result. Power, budgets, and responsibility remain closed to continuous public scrutiny. After the next disaster, the Party can launch another rectification and charge the weakest residents for it. In 2017, Beijing mobilized citywide enforcement within two days while leaving years of hukou exclusion and inadequate low-cost housing untouched.

Sources

1. Beijing Notice on the Safety Inspection, Clearance, and Rectification Campaignprimary-recordUnchecked
2. Campaign of Forced Evictions in Beijing Contravenes International Human Rights Standardsgovernment-reportUnchecked
3. Chinese Artist Detained for Filming Beijing Evictionsrights-reportUnchecked
4. Constitution of the Communist Party of ChinaLive

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5. 2023 Party and state institutional reform planLive

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