Analysis
Xenophobia: How External Enemies Protect Internal Power
How xenophobic mobilization redirects social frustration outward and replaces internal accountability with emotion.
Contents
How Xenophobia Protects Internal Power
External enemies absorb emotion that could become internal accountability.
Fact Criticism vs Xenophobia
Criticism needs evidence; xenophobia needs only a target.
| Dimension | Fact Criticism | Xenophobic Mobilization |
|---|---|---|
| Target | Specific actor and behavior | Whole country or people |
| Evidence | Checkable material | Emotional label |
| Proportion | Limits responsibility | Expands hostility |
| Direction | Can question domestic power | Only vents outward |
Japan began releasing treated water from the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant on August 24, 2023. The International Atomic Energy Agency had assessed the plan in July. It found the proposed controlled, gradual discharge consistent with relevant international safety standards, with a negligible radiological impact if carried out as assessed. That judgment concerned a specified operation whose implementation would still require monitoring. [1][5]
By August 30, Japan's foreign ministry said its switchboard had received roughly 500 nuisance calls since August 25. It also reported harassment of Japan-related facilities in China and targets within Japan. The ministry said the calls appeared to originate in China; it did not identify every caller. [2]
Asked about the calls that day, Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Wang Wenbin said China protected foreign institutions and nationals. He then attributed the situation's underlying cause to Japan's decision to begin the discharge. A question about harassment had become another accusation against Japan. [3]
A dispute about monitoring becomes a test of identity
A serious challenge to the discharge plan would examine treatment, sampling, independent oversight and the response to unexpected results. The limits of the IAEA assessment lie in the plan it examined and the conditions under which that plan is implemented. Those conditions warrant scrutiny. [1]
Harassing an ordinary Japanese person contributes nothing to that scrutiny. The person answering a telephone cannot revise the discharge procedure. Directing anger toward an accessible Japanese target gives the caller a sense of participation while leaving the actual decision-making process untouched.
For a propaganda operation, that substitution is useful. Technical disagreement requires room for contrary evidence. Hostility organized around national identity can flourish without it. Once the argument becomes a demand to choose a side, reading a scientific assessment can itself be treated as a suspicious act. The public loses access to a usable discussion of risk and faces pressure to demonstrate loyalty through anger.
Organized amplification puts the costs on other people
Microsoft documented one organized channel for that anger. Its research described Storm-1376 as a CCP-linked influence operation that mounted a multilingual campaign against Japan after the discharge began, including attacks on the IAEA's scientific assessment. It also found identical videos posted by the operation and influencers affiliated with Chinese state media. [5]
These findings do not establish who directed individual nuisance calls. They identify organized messaging, rather than the motive or instructions of every person who harassed someone. The political responsibility for that messaging remains substantial: amplifying hostility makes it more visible and supplies language that people can use to justify abuse.
The benefits and costs fall on different people. Campaign operators gain attention, and officials gain public anger they can cite in foreign disputes. People with no authority over the policy receive the abuse. The ease of reaching a shop, institution or private individual helps explain the cruelty of this form of mobilization. Its participants claim to confront a state while imposing the immediate cost on someone unable to change its decisions.
Blaming Japan leaves China's own conduct unanswered
The Chinese foreign ministry's August 30 answer illustrates how responsibility slips away. Beijing's objection to a Japanese policy does not resolve questions about protecting people in China or the consequences of its own public messaging. These are responsibilities within China's control. [3]
Making an external policy the origin of every subsequent conflict provides a recurring escape. A question about harassment returns to the discharge. A challenge to an inflammatory assertion becomes a dispute over whether the challenger is sufficiently angry at Japan. Specific conduct that could be examined is absorbed into an open-ended confrontation between nations.
The CCP benefits from occupying two positions at once. It can present public anger as evidence supporting its diplomatic case, then leave individuals responsible for conduct that becomes embarrassing or unlawful. The propaganda apparatus receives less scrutiny over the claims it selected, the qualifications it omitted and its obligations toward people exposed to hostility.
Loyalty tests obstruct domestic accountability
Someone can oppose a foreign government's decision and object to the harassment of its citizens. When that distinction is treated as disloyal, debate becomes an examination of the speaker's political allegiance. Instead of answering the evidence, participants are pushed to account for whose interests they supposedly serve.
This habit travels easily beyond a foreign-policy dispute. External enemies can be invoked to explain economic pressure, social conflict or governing failures. Each invocation creates an opportunity to displace a question about a concrete decision at home. A government can demand support by identifying an opponent while leaving its own performance unanswered.
Citizens should be able to demand reliable information, verifiable regulation and protection from harassment without passing an official test of patriotism. The requirement to prove loyalty gives those in power a way to reject the question before addressing it.
Accountability belongs with those who can act
Japan's government, the plant operator and the international oversight bodies must answer for their respective decisions and work. China's government has its own responsibilities for public order, information and the protection of foreign nationals. Assigning every failure to another country creates an exemption for power at home.
CCP xenophobic propaganda exploits that exemption. It magnifies the apparent reach of a foreign enemy while obscuring officials nearby who can make decisions, shape public messaging and provide protection. Ordinary foreigners become convenient targets. The authorities controlling the conditions around those targets become harder to see. Accountability requires bringing the people with actual authority back into view.
Sources: The Guardian report on Fukushima wastewater and China-linked disinformation[4]; Microsoft report on East Asia influence operations[5]; Freedom House report on Beijing's global media influence[7].
Sources
IAEA Finds Japan’s Plans to Release Treated Water into the Sea at Fukushima Consistent with International Safety Standardsprimary-recordUnchecked
Press Conference by Foreign Press Secretary ONO Hikarikoprimary-recordUnchecked
Wang Wenbin’s Regular Press Conference on August 30, 2023primary-recordUnchecked
The Guardian report on Fukushima wastewater and China-linked disinformationLive
Microsoft report on East Asia influence operationsLive
Freedom House report on Beijing's global media influenceLive
Freedom House report on Beijing's global media influenceLive
China Media Project CCP dictionaryUnchecked