Event Record
Xinjiang IJOP and Mass Risk Screening
The data-driven policing chain documented by technical research and the OHCHR assessment.
Contents
What Happened: IJOP Turned Daily Life into Risk Records
Around 2016, Xinjiang police deployed the Integrated Joint Operations Platform, known as IJOP. It brought identity numbers, phones, vehicles, finance, hotels, border crossings, and camera feeds into a risk-screening interface. Human Rights Watch reverse-engineered an associated application in 2019 and found prompts for “unusual” behavior, including frequent phone changes, overseas contacts, or failure to install required software. Police and grid workers received the alerts, visited homes, searched devices, or referred people into detention and “vocational education” systems. [7]
Background: From Data Collection to Street Enforcement
IJOP was more than a database. Rules generated alerts and dispatched tasks to police stations, communities, and checkpoints. Officers could retrieve travel, communications, and family links. Grid workers confirmed addresses, religious activity, and employment. A high-risk label could lead to a summons, a travel restriction, or detention. The 2022 OHCHR assessment found that mass arbitrary detention, surveillance, and discriminatory policies produced serious impacts on Uyghurs and other predominantly Muslim minorities. [10]
Institutions and Actors: Legal and Institutional Interfaces
Xinjiang public-security offices ran the platform. The Ministry of Public Security and Party political-legal committees set security priorities. Streets, village committees, and checkpoints performed verification. National laws later required a purpose and security measures for personal-data processing, but national-security and counterterrorism exceptions remain broad. No public audit reconstructs how police data were gathered or used between 2016 and 2022. A 2025 public-security video regulation further expanded police control over camera networking, access, and sharing. [3] [4] [1]
Official Response: Official Rationale and the Position of the Screened
China describes IJOP and related systems as tools for counterterrorism, deradicalization, and violence prevention, and denies systematic ethnic repression. Technical research shows fields covering religious practice, family contacts, and device use that have no direct link to a violent act. OHCHR concluded that the policies produced arbitrary detention and collective punishment. Public records do not disclose the complete algorithm, false-positive rate, or appeal outcomes. People marked as risky cannot inspect or correct the record that restricts their lives. [7] [10]
Outcome and Aftermath: How a Risk Label Spreads
An alert can move from the platform to a police station and then to a school, factory, or neighborhood committee. Family links mean that one person's travel, religious practice, or phone use can affect the whole household. Employers and schools avoid liability by excluding anyone marked by the system. An opaque probability judgment becomes a real restriction while responsibility is hidden behind a “model prompt” or an order from above. [11] [12]
Evidence Limits: Replacing a Public Accusation with an Algorithmic Flag
Through IJOP, the CCP embedded security politics in ordinary administration. The center and political-legal system set counterterrorism and “stability” targets. Police encoded them as risk rules. Grassroots officials executed searches, summonses, and detention. Platforms and telecom firms supplied continuous data. Screened people had no judicial review, independent oversight, or effective appeal, and could not know what behavior triggered a label. Public evidence cannot reconstruct every order, but it establishes the system's direction. An entire group's way of life was converted into suspicious data, an administrative alert into punishment, and ethnic assimilation into the language of technical governance. [10] [7]
Sources
Regulation on Public Security Video Image Information Systemsprimary-recordLive
MPS Rules for Public Security Video Information Systemsprimary-recordUnavailable
Personal Information Protection Law of the PRCprimary-recordLive
Data Security Law of the PRCprimary-recordLive
Provisions on the Administration of Internet User Account Informationprimary-recordLive
Provisions on Algorithmic Recommendation in Internet Information Servicesprimary-recordLive
China's Algorithms of Repression: Reverse Engineering a Xinjiang Police Apptechnical-researchLive
We Chat, They Watchtechnical-researchLive
Censored Contagion IItechnical-researchLive
OHCHR Assessment of Human Rights Concerns in Xinjiangofficial-findingLive
Treasury Sanctions on Biometric Surveillance Technologyofficial-findingLive
2024 Country Report on Human Rights Practices: Chinagovernment-reportLive
Official Accountability Record on the Henan Red-Code Incidentprimary-recordRedirected
Investigation into Red Health Codes Assigned to Henan Bank Depositorsinvestigative-reportingLive
CECC 2025 Annual Reportgovernment-reportLive
Human Rights Watch Report on Detained White Paper Protestersinvestigative-reportingLive
Amnesty International Interviews One Year after the White Paper Movementinvestigative-reportingLive