Case File
The Xu Zhiyong and Ding Jiaxi Case: From Private Gathering to Subversion Convictions
An evidence-graded reconstruction of institutions, procedure, disputes, and consequences in The Xu Zhiyong and Ding Jiaxi Case: From Private Gathering to Subversion Convictions.
Key eventsFull case chronology and key recordsExpand
A nationwide operation followed the Xiamen gathering
Xu Zhiyong, Ding Jiaxi, and other citizens were detained, disappeared, or placed in RSDL after a private gathering and related activity.
The cases proceeded as subversion prosecutions
Both men were arrested and prosecuted, while access to lawyers, family contact, and torture allegations drew continuing UN concern.
A Linyi court held closed trials
The proceedings were closed to the public, families and supporters could not attend, and judgments were withheld for months.
Xu and Ding received heavy sentences
Xu received fourteen years and Ding twelve; authorities treated the activity as subversion while external bodies challenged the restrictions on association, expression, and fair trial.
Contents
Control chain: The Xu Zhiyong and Ding Jiaxi Case: From Private Gathering to Subversion Convictions
In December 2019, Xu Zhiyong, Ding Jiaxi, and other citizens attended a private gathering in Xiamen. After the gathering, Ding was detained and Xu was arrested in the months that followed. Several participants disappeared, were summoned, or were placed in residential surveillance at a designated location. Police did not treat the meeting as ordinary private contact. They opened a nationwide investigation under a national-security frame. [1][17]
Xu and Ding had spent years discussing constitutional government, law, education, and civic participation. They did not organize an armed action or control a government institution, yet prosecutors charged them with subversion of state power. In June 2022, a Linyi court held separate trials closed to the public. Families and supporters could not attend. In April 2023, Xu received fourteen years in prison and Ding twelve. The judgments and full evidence were not promptly made public, leaving outsiders unable to test how private discussion became a subversion case. [2][15]
A private gathering became a national-security case
The Xiamen meeting was a discussion among citizens. Once arrests began, police placed participants' relationships, speech, and later contacts inside one investigative chain. Xu's public writing and speeches and Ding's civic activity entered the prosecution's account of subversion. National-security offenses thus reached beyond violence or a plan to seize power and covered public criticism and attempts at independent organization.
The CCP broke freedom of association into prosecutable acts. Attending a gathering could become an investigative lead. Political discussion could become evidence of intent. A call for civic rights could be described as an effort to overthrow the state. Prosecutors only had to link the acts together to portray a private network with no government power as a criminal organization. The defendants were punished for a political possibility rather than an injury caused by the meeting.
RSDL severed outside contact
Residential surveillance at a designated location lets investigators control a suspect in an undisclosed place for an extended period. Decisions amending the Criminal Procedure Law and Supreme People's Procuratorate oversight rules provide a legal framework, but the public rules do not give families and lawyers practical means to resist secret custody. [3][4]
Xu and Ding spent long periods before trial without normal contact with family or counsel. UN special procedures recorded incommunicado detention, restricted access to lawyers, and torture allegations. Outsiders could not inspect interrogation records or determine the conditions under which statements were obtained. Secret custody let police control the body first, then allowed prosecutors and courts to reach a conviction with the defense kept in the dark.
Closed trials fixed one political interpretation
The Linyi proceedings were closed and the judgments were delayed. Society could not hear witnesses, test evidence, or compare the defense case. The court kept the form of a trial while leaving the security agencies to define the central facts. Xu's fourteen-year sentence and Ding's twelve-year sentence told other civic groups the price of independent discussion.
The CCP did not answer their political arguments in public debate. It ended the dispute with subversion convictions. The judgments moved dissent from public life into prison, and prosecutors did not have to show that the meeting had changed government operations. National security became a criminal-law tool for punishing a political future before it existed.
The sentences targeted civic connections
The case affected more than the two defendants. Participants were summoned, monitored, or pressured into silence. Lawyers and families were pushed outside the procedure. Other citizens saw that cross-regional contact could lead to a long prison term. The CCP attacked the ability of people to build trust, share judgments, and turn private discussion into public action.
Official rules can describe safeguards for RSDL, while actual enforcement uses the measure to cut information. The public record establishes the sentences and UN concern about the trials and torture risks. It does not disclose the full command chain or every interrogation record. What is already documented shows how national-security charges and secret custody narrowed the space for civic organization in China.
Sources: UN Working Group communication on Xu Zhiyong and Ding Jiaxi[1], UN Special Procedures communication on their torture allegations and closed trials[2], Criminal Procedure Law decision on RSDL[3], Supreme People's Procuratorate rules on RSDL oversight[4].
Related reading: RSDL and rights claims, the 709 crackdown, secret trials, transnational repression.
What the available sources establish
UN special procedures have repeatedly raised concerns about incommunicado detention, counsel access, and torture risks under RSDL.
UN experts have described the 2015 709 crackdown as continuing systematic repression of human-rights lawyers and defenders.
Sources
UN Working Group Communication on Xu Zhiyong and Ding Jiaxigovernment-reportLive
UN Special Procedures Communication on Xu Zhiyong and Ding Jiaxiun-recordLive
NPC Standing Committee Decision Amending the Criminal Procedure Lawprimary-recordLive
SPP Rules on Oversight of Residential Surveillance at a Designated Locationprimary-recordLive
Five-Agency Rules on Strict Exclusion of Illegally Obtained Evidenceprimary-recordLive
Implementation Measures for the Detention Center Regulationsprimary-recordLive
MPS and Ministry of Justice Notice on Lawyer Meetings in Detention Centersprimary-recordLive
Mental Health Law of the PRCprimary-recordUnavailable
Exit and Entry Administration Law of the PRCprimary-recordLive
Prison Law of the PRCprimary-recordUnchecked
NPC Standing Committee Decision Amending the Supervision Lawprimary-recordLive
UN Mandates Communication on RSDLgovernment-reportLive
UN Expert Statement on Chang Weiping and the Crackdown on Lawyersgovernment-reportLive
UN Special Rapporteur on Torture Findings after China Visitgovernment-reportLive
CECC Report on China's Criminal Justice Systemgovernment-reportLive
UN Experts Renew Call for Accountability for Cao Shunli's Deathgovernment-reportLive
2024 U.S. State Department Human Rights Report on Chinagovernment-reportLive
CECC 2025 Annual Reportgovernment-reportLive
Reporting on the 709 Crackdown on Human Rights Lawyersinvestigative-reportingLive
Human Rights Watch Investigation of China's Black Jailsinvestigative-reportingLive
Regulations on Religious Affairsprimary-recordLive
Ministry of Justice Explanation of the Religious Affairs Regulationprimary-recordLive
Population and Family Planning Law of the PRCprimary-recordLive
White Paper on Vocational Education and Training in Xinjiangprimary-recordUnavailable